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1 Introduction
What type of “currency” should firms choose when they trade intellectual prop-
erty (IP)? Looking at the empirical evidence, it is not obvious that cash is the
most preferable method of payment. Rather, it seems that firms pay with their
own IP in exchange for other firms’ technology. This is evident in the empirical
discussion of so-called cross-licensing agreements. Put simply, cross-licensing im-
plies granting reciprocal access to IP or patents by firms. Evidence suggests that
cross-licensing is more than a simple, reciprocal seller-buyer-relation but is part
of a long-term strategy. Intel’s formerly proclaimed “IP-for-IP” strategy is a case
in point. This strategy involved that Intel committed itself to grant access to its
IP only to firms who gave Intel access to their own IP.1 Hence, Intel purposely
restricted its own trade of IP to non-monetary transactions. On a more general
level, Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) observe that for product innovations in
complex product industries, 45% of the firms use patents for blocking and ne-
gotiation reasons, but not in order to earn license revenues. They also report
that “[r]espondents noted that firms are reluctant to sell their technology, but
are willing to trade it only to firms that have valuable technology (intellectual
property) to use as currency” (p.29).
This paper suggests that the choice of currency (cash versus IP) affects the
R&D activity of firms. We show that a commitment to an IP-for-IP strategy
can be a profitable means to alter the allocation of R&D investments and thus
soften R&D competition. However, such a strategy involves costs as it forgoes
potential gains from trade when IP is distributed asymmetrically in the market.
By providing a simple model of the trade-offs involved, this paper shows that
IP-for-IP has ex ante impacts on firms’ innovative activities.
We consider two firms that are engaged in the same two R&D projects. This
implies that each firm has to decide about its overall R&D investment as well as
the allocation across projects. The projects stochastically yield IP that can be
commercialized, each in a different market. However, firms differ in their ability
to commercialize IP in these markets due to differences in assets complementary
1According to Shapiro (2002),“[t]he FTC alleged that Intel . . . was acting anti-competitively
by refusing to license certain trade secrets to firms that would not enter into cross-licenses
with Intel.” For further details refer also to Shapiro (2001), Shapiro (2004), and the FTC’s
documentation at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/d9288.shtm.
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to innovations (e.g. in sales and marketing or in subsequent manufacturing pro-
cesses; see Teece, 1986, 2006). This allows them to capture gains from trade when
a firm with lower commercialization ability sells its IP to the one with higher abil-
ity. At the same time, gains from trade also raise the incentives to pursue R&D
in projects outside firm’s key markets, thus increasing R&D competition.
By committing to an IP-for-IP strategy, firms may restrict R&D competition.
This affects both the level and allocation of R&D expenditures. In particular,
IP-for-IP generates a higher level of ‘expertise’, that is, a greater focus of R&D
on firms’ areas of high capability. The analysis shows that strategies of restrict-
ing trade in technologies to reciprocal exchange can be profit-enhancing. This
is particularly the case in industries where firms differ in their commercializa-
tion abilities. The profitability of choosing an IP-for-IP strategy is even more
pronounced (1) when patents are complements and (2) for asymmetries between
firms.
There is a growing body of literature that studies the impact of technology
licensing and intellectual property design on market structure and welfare. This
literature in particular focuses on the effect of licensing on competition (Shapiro,
2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2004) and litigation (Choi, 2010). These analyses usually
provide ‘ex-post’ analyses of cross-licensing, i.e. based on situations where two
(or more) firms already possess patents. Cross-licensing agreements (or patent
pools as an extension thereof) thus arise naturally as agreements between mul-
tiple owners of patents. While these aspects are of great importance, it appears
that there is more to cross-licensing than the mere composition of two distinct
licensing deals. In particular, several analyses of cross-licensing highlight the re-
ciprocal aspect in accessing technology. For example, according to Grindley and
Teece (1997, p.23), “to obtain access to needed technologies, Hewlett-Packard
needs patents to trade in cross-licensing agreements. . . . This IP portfolio . . .
is also invaluable as leverage to ensure access to outside technology.” The same
authors report that IBM acquires necessary outside IP rights “primarily by trad-
ing access to its own patents, a process called ‘cross-licensing’ ” (p.15). Referring
to conversations with semiconductor firms, Hall and Ziedonis (2001, p.107) argue
that “many manufacturers had decided to ‘harvest’ more patents from their R&D
. . . to assist them in winning favorable terms in cross-licensing negotiations with
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other firms in the industry.”2 The relevance of using patents in negotiations (but
not as a source of licensing revenues) is also reflected in the survey findings of
Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000).
Overall, these reports of cross-licensing agreements and firms’ motivations
to patent raise the question why a firm’s own IP (cross-licensing) is a different
currency than cash (one-way licensing) when seeking access to outside technology.
In a more general context, Prendergast and Stole (1996) address the potential
economic implications of monetary versus non-monetary trade (i.e. barter) in
assets. We contribute to the literature by highlighting why the type of currency
in the market for technology might matter in the context of firms’ R&D activities.
Our model contains the features of a patent race and is therefore closely related
to the traditional patent race literature. The symmetric models incorporated in
Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980) show that patent races among a fixed
number of firms lead to overinvestment in R&D compared to the cooperative
solution.3 The major reason for the existence of overinvestment is the difference
between the private and the social value of a patent. However, unlike in our
paper, these models are not concerned with project choice in R&D. This links
our analysis to the literature focusing on project choice rather than the level of
investments in R&D (e.g. Bhattacharya and Mookherjee, 1986; Dasgupta and
Maskin, 1987; Cabral, 2003; Gerlach, Ronde, and Stahl, 2005; Anderson and
Cabral, 2007). These papers are primarily interested in the choice of risk that
firms take in R&D competition given a fixed R&D budget. In our paper we
do not consider risk-taking behavior by firms. Rather, firms’ allocation of R&D
across investment projects is driven by the trading environment in the market for
technology.
Looking at multiple research projects highlights two different motives for firms
to undertake R&D. Apart from the obvious value of an innovation in its use at
the inventor, an innovation may be valuable as a tradeable good (provided prop-
erty rights are well specified). This latter value often features in the management
literature on innovation (see Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001). However,
the value of technology as a tradeable good depends on the benefits from and
2In a similar way, The Economist (2005) writes that “[u]nless firms have patents of their
own to assert so they can reach a cross-licensing agreement (often with money changing hands
too), they will be in trouble.”
3For a survey on these and additional models on patent races, see Reinganum (1989).
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the terms of trade. Benefits from trade arise because firms differ in capabilities
regarding the commercialization of innovations. However, an IP-for-IP trading
restriction limits the realization of the gains from trade and in turn alters the rel-
ative weight of firms’ R&D motives. The paper shows how this changes incentives
to undertake R&D across different types of projects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the key assumptions
of the model. Section 3 first analyzes R&D competition under free trade versus
IP-for-IP and compares the outcomes of these two regimes before considering
the profitability of an IP-for-IP based strategy. Section 4 introduces a more
specific cost function in order to provide a more detailed analysis. Section 5 then
introduces complementary patents to explicitly analyze cross-licensing agreement.
This section also illustrates why even stronger trading restrictions than IP-for-IP
can be less profitable. Section 6 introduces asymmetric firms. Finally, section 7
concludes.
2 Model
Set-up: We consider two firms (i = 1, 2) that are potentially engaged in two
markets (j = 1, 2). In each market, a firm can pursue a research project which
stochastically yields at most one patent covering its whole R&D output.4 The
maximum (market) value of either patent is symmetric and given by V . The whole
R&D process is sufficiently uncertain such that the outcome is non-contractible.
Hence, firms cannot write ex ante (licensing or sale) contracts for the new patent.
Firms can be heterogeneous with respect to their core market. This difference
is captured by two aspects: (i) Firms differ in their commercialization abilities
regarding the patents. We assume that firm i can fully exploit the value of patent
i whereas it can only realize a fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] of the value of patent j 6= i. (ii)
Each firm has a (weak) advantage in terms of R&D cost within the market where
it has full commercialization ability. This is more clearly specified in the next
step.
4We initially rule out complementary patent relationships within a certain project. This
assumption is relaxed in section 5. Moreover, patent protection is assumed to be perfect, i.e.
it is not possible to invalidate a granted patent in court.
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R&D Strategies and Costs: Firms decide about the unconditional probabil-
ity of success in each project. If both firms are successful on a certain project
then each firm obtains the respective patent with probability 1/2. Let the un-
conditional success probability of firm i for project j be sij ∈ [0, 1] with cost
ci(si) ≥ 0, where si denotes the strategy tuple of firm i. We assume that the
firm’s cost functions are continuously differentiable and symmetric. Additionally,
we assume for i, j, k ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= k
∂ci
∂sij
≥ 0 , ∂
2ci
∂s2ij
≥ 0 , ∂
2ci
∂sii∂sik
≥ 0 (C1)
and for any s′ik > s
′
ii
ci(s
′
ii, s
′
ik) ≥ ci(s′ik, s′ii) ,
∂ci
∂sik
∣∣∣∣
sii=s
′
ii
sik=s
′
ik
≥ ∂ci
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
sii=s
′
ik
sik=s
′
ii
(C2)
Assumption C1 implies that costs are increasing and (weakly) convex and that
there are no benefits of scope across the two projects. C2 implies that a firm has
a potential cost advantage (or: no cost disadvantage) in its core market. While
these assumptions suffice to illustrate the main trade-off in the model, we will
later use a specific cost function in order to derive further results .
Trade in Technology: Once firms have obtained patents they are potentially
free to trade these. By doing so, firms can realize gains from trade in cases
where δ < 1. If trade takes place then it is assumed that firms bargain with
equal bargaining power over the price of the patent to be exchanged.5 In the
model, the terms of trade in technology chosen play a crucial role. Firms may
choose between two scenarios. In the first scenario, labeled “free trade”, firms can
exchange patents without any restrictions. This enables them to realize all gains
from trade. In contrast, we consider a second scenario where firms are restricted
in their trading opportunities. We refer to this case as “IP-for-IP”. Under the
terms of IP-for-IP, firms are not able to use money for the purchase of a patent
from another firm. Rather, a firm may only use its own IP as currency for the IP
5The basic model only considers barter (or, put differently, exclusive licensing) and therefore
neglects licensing deals which involve simultaneous usage of a patent by both firms. We examine
multiple usage of patents in section 5.
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of the other firm. That is, in the IP-for-IP scenario, trade in technology has to
take place on a reciprocal basis. Contrary to the free trade case, with IP-for-IP
firms may not be able to exploit all potential gains from trade.
Time Structure and Equilibrium Concept:
t=0 Firms simultaneously set their terms of trade.
t=1 Firms simultaneously decide about their R&D investments.
t=2 Nature determines the allocation of patents (conditional on R&D expendi-
tures)
t=3 Trade takes place if the terms of trade of both firms allow it.6 All payoffs
are realized hereafter.
We assume that firms can commit themselves to the terms of trade set initially
when they enter the trading stage. As will be clear below, firms might want to
change these terms in the last stage of the game. Hence, we enable firms to
restrict their ability to change their initial decision.7
We are looking at subgame perfect equilibria of the game in order to determine
when trade restricting strategies may be part of firms’ equilibrium behavior. The
key part of the analysis will be to examine the decision on R&D expenditures in
t=1, where we look for symmetric Nash equilibria. Additionally, in case of mul-
tiple equilibria, we disregard those equilibria that are always Pareto dominated.
Finally, we define the following characterization of equilibria:
Definition
A (symmetric) equilibrium (s∗ii, s
∗
ij) has“higher expertise”than equilibrium (s
′
ii, s
′
ij)
if s∗ii ≥ s′ii and s∗ij ≤ s′ij for i 6= j. Equilibrium (s∗ii, s∗ij) is called an “expert equi-
librium” if (i) s∗ii ≥ s∗ij for i 6= j and (ii) it has higher expertise than any other
equilibrium.
6As the IP-for-IP scenario is more restrictive than the free trade scenario and since trade
only occurs if both firms agree to it, the IP-for-IP scenario always applies if it is chosen by at
least one firm in t=0.
7This might be achieved by delegating the decision in t=0 to a (central) manager who
maximizes expected profits and incurs costs if he were to deviate from his initial decision.
See e.g. the discussion in Maskin and Tirole (1999) about how renegotiation can be avoided.
Alternatively, one may rationalize this commitment power in an infinitely repeated game.
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Hence, expertise in this context is captured by the firms focusing their R&D
investments more on the market where their comparative advantage (in terms of
costs and commercialization ability) is than on the other market.
3 Analysis
In the following, we characterize equilibrium R&D expenditures under the free
trade (FT ) and the IP-for-IP (IP ) scenario (section 3.1). In 3.2, we look at the
choice of free trade versus IP-for-IP.
3.1 Equilibrium R&D Investments
Generally, firms’ profits depend on the pre-trade allocation of patents by nature
and the trading environment which determines the final allocation of a patent.
Let ωj ∈ Ω ≡ {∅, 1, 2} denote the post-R&D, pre-trade owner of patent j. Then
there are nine possible pre-trade allocations of patents (ω1, ω2). Let p(ω1, ω2) be
the probability of an allocation. Similarly, let piΘi (ω1, ω2) denote firm i’s post-trade
payoff from this allocation, which depends on the trading scenario Θ ∈ {FT, IP}:
When there are no restrictions to trading technology, each firm will ex post be
allocated the patent it values most. The price at which patents are traded is
determined by bargaining such that the parties split the gains from trade equally.
Under IP-for-IP, gains from trade can only be realized if trade takes place on
a reciprocal basis. The payoffs in this scenario consequently differ from the free
trade payoffs in some but not all states of the world as long as firms have different
commercialization abilities regarding the two patents (i.e. as long as δ < 1).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 1 provides the probabilities and payoffs to the two firms for all possible
patent allocations and scenarios. Consider for example allocation (∅, 1): Firm 1
gains the patent for market 2 and values it at δV . As firm 2’s valuation is higher,
they trade and split the gains, (1−δ)V , equally under free trade. However, under
IP-for-IP, there is no possibility to barter, so firm 1 uses the patent itself at the
reduced value of δV . Similarly, for allocation (2, 2): Under free trade firm 2 sells
the patent for market 1 to firm 1, whereas it keeps both patents under IP-for-IP.
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In case of allocation (2, 1), the two firms exchange the patents gained in R&D
under both trading scenarios, without money changing hands due to symmetric
valuations.8
Given the above payoff structure, firm i’s expected profit in the R&D stage
under trading scenario Θ is
E[piΘi ] =
∑
ω1∈Ω
∑
ω2∈Ω
p(ω1, ω2)pi
Θ
i (ω1, ω2)− c(sii, sij) . (1)
Under free trade the two research projects are not strategically linked with each
other as trading patent 1 is not affected by the trade of patent 2. The intro-
duction of IP-for-IP based trade restrictions strategically interlinks both research
projects: The ability to trade a certain patent depends on the distribution of
patents over both projects. If δ is smaller than one then a firm might be forced
to commercialize a patent at value δV while trade would have been desirable.
However, if the competing firm happens to have to other patent, that is for al-
location (2,1), exchange is possible. We can now derive the following results for
the R&D investment stage.
Lemma 1
1. For δ = 1, free trade and IP-for-IP yield the same set of equilibria.
2. There always exists an expert equilibrium under free trade and IP-for-IP.
3. For both free trade and IP-for-IP, an equilibrium (s′ii, s
′
ij) with s
′
ij > s
′
ii
and i 6= j is always Pareto-dominated by another equilibrium with higher
expertise.
Proof: See A.1
The first result in Lemma 1 is trivial: For δ = 1, firms are homogenous as they
have identical commercialization abilities. This implies that there are no gains
from trade and hence, trade or trade restrictions do not affect firm profits. The
second result is more important, as it establishes existence of both, equilibrium
and a partial ordering of equilibria in terms of expertise. Lastly, Lemma 1 also
establishes that equilibria where firms invest more in the market where their
commercialization ability is lower than in the other market are always Pareto-
dominated.
8We consider asymmetric valuations in section 6.
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The existence results of Lemma 1 are obtained by transforming the R&D
investment model into a supermodular game where symmetric equilibria and
order properties have been derived (see Vives, 1999, 2005). The following result
also builds upon comparative statics for equilibria in supermodular games:
Proposition 1
The expert equilibrium under IP-for-IP has higher expertise than the expert
equilibrium under free trade.
Proof: See A.2
This results states that the ordering of equilibria by expertise can also be
applied to the expert equilibria across the two trading scenarios. It shows that
choice of IP-for-IP leads to higher expertise if the expert equilibrium prevails
under IP-for-IP. Hence, restricting trade to reciprocal exchange results in firms
focusing their R&D on the market with higher commercialization ability, as the
other market becomes less attractive. The result resembles the development
of “spheres of influence” in the two-market context of Bernheim and Whinston
(1990): The simultaneous competition of firms on multiple markets enables the
firms to use strategies which reduce a firm’s competitive behavior on the com-
petitor’s market. Whereas in Bernheim and Whinston (1990) the enhancement
of the strategy space is via punishments in a repeated setting, it is via trading
restrictions in our model.
3.2 Choosing the Terms of Trade
Assessing the optimality of free trade versus IP-for-IP involves comparing the
costs and benefits of each scenario. We first consider the case of the cost structure
as specified in C1 and C2. In the subsequent sections we use a specific functional
form in order to derive further results.
The preceding results suggest that the allocation of investments has higher
expertise under IP-for-IP than under free trade. However, it is not clear whether
this yields costs or benefits. The following result shows that unless shifts in
investments induced by IP-for-IP are beneficial for firm profits, free trade will
always be the optimal trading scenario.
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Lemma 2
For δ < 1, choosing IP-for-IP forgoes gains from trade unless IP-for-IP yields
sij = 0 for i 6= j.
Proof: Inspection of the payoffs in table 1 shows that post-trade payoffs under
IP-for-IP are lower than under free trade for the pre-trade patent allocations
(2, ∅), (∅, 1), (1, 1) and (2, 2). 
As IP-for-IP is potentially costly, benefits from investment decisions are re-
quired for IP-for-IP to be profitable. These benefits can arise, for example, if
there are scale effects of R&D investments at the project level. In that case, fo-
cusing investments on few projects instead of lower investments in many different
projects raises firm profits and makes IP-for-IP interesting for firms. Apart from
the allocation across projects (captured by the definition of expertise), benefits
from IP-for-IP may arise if a change in the total level of investments yields higher
profits. The functional example in the following analysis captures benefits from
IP-for-IP due to its effect on both, level and allocation of investments.
4 A Specific Example
For the remainder of the paper, we use the following functional form for firms’
costs
ci(si) = − ln(1− sii)− ln(1− sij) . (C3)
This cost function provides a basis to derive further results on the optimality of
choosing the IP-for-IP trade restriction.9 C3 is a special case of C1 and C2 with
no cost (dis-)advantages across firms. Lastly, we assume V ≥ 16, which eases the
analysis of equilibria with interior solutions.
We can now consider the costs and benefits of an IP-for-IP strategy in more
detail. For benchmark purposes we first derive the optimal cooperative solution
regarding the R&D investments. Joint profits are
E[pii + pij] =
∑
k=1,2
[V (sik + sjk − siksjk) + ln(1− sik) + ln(1− sjk)]. (2)
9Technically, the cost function is undefined for sij = 1 (i, j ∈ {1, 2}). We therefore assume
limsij→1 ci(si) =∞. Moreover, choice of success probability s at costs − ln(1− s) is equivalent
to the choice of R&D expenditures x and modeling the success probability as (1− e−x), see e.g.
Kultti, Takalo, and Toikka (2007).
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This is maximized if
(1− sik)(1− sjk) = 1
V
(3)
with the (cooperative) investment levels
s
Coop
ii =
V − 1
V
and sCoopji = 0 , i 6= j . (4)
as a specific solution to the joint optimization problem.10 We now turn to firms’
individual, non-cooperative, R&D investment decisions.
Lemma 3
1. Under free trade, the equilibrium regarding firms’ R&D investments is
unique and characterized by overinvestment compared to the cooperative
solution. The degree of overinvestment is increasing in δ.
2. Under IP-for-IP, (i) there exists an R&D equilibrium that is characterized
by overinvestment in comparison to the cooperative solution for all δ ∈ [0, 1];
(ii) for all δ ∈ [0, δˆ] with δˆ ≡ 2
V+1
, there exists an additional equilibrium
with sii =
V−1
V
and sij = 0 for i 6= j. The latter equilibrium thus coincides
with the cooperative solution.
Proof: See A.3
The first part of Lemma 3 establishes, for the free trade case, the standard
result of R&D overinvestment in the patent race literature. Here, the patent race
is asymmetric as firms have different commercialization abilities across the two
projects.
Part 2 of the lemma shows that the strategic interrelation between both
projects under IP-for-IP leads to multiple equilibria. One equilibrium (the “high
investment equilibrium”) exists over the full range of δ and results in overinvest-
ment similar to the free trade equilibrium. For δ = 1, this equilibrium coincides
with the free trade equilibrium. The second equilibrium (“cooperative equilib-
rium”) only exists if δ ≤ δˆ. Within this parameter range, it constitutes the
expert equilibrium as it implies maximum expertise for the two firms.
10The optimality condition (3) implies that the allocation of investments across firms does
not matter. However, if a firm incurs some (arbitrarily small) fixed cost whenever it decides
to invest in a project, it is optimal that only one firm is active in each project. In this case,
s
Coop
ik =
V−1
V
and sCoopjk = 0 is jointly optimal.
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Proposition 2
For δ ∈ [0, δˆ], choice of IP-for-IP, sii = V−1V and sij = 0 for i 6= j is a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Proof: As this strategy combination yields the jointly optimal solution as an
equilibrium, no firm has incentives to deviate. 
The combination of Lemmas 2 and 3 implies that for δ ≤ δˆ, R&D competition
under IP-for-IP yields profit levels as in the cooperative solution. By selecting
the expert equilibrium under IP-for-IP, the firms in this example realize both
the efficient level and allocation of R&D investments. The firms thus gain from
committing to what appear to be ex post inefficient terms of trade.
By numerical analysis of the model, we are able to further characterize firms’
optimal choice of trading scenarios: The high investment equilibrium under IP-
for-IP also yields higher expertise and lower levels of overinvestment than the free
trade equilibrium. However, the costs of foregone trading opportunities outweigh
these benefits at the investment level. As a consequence, the choice of IP-for-IP
and the high investment equilibrium levels does not constitute a subgame perfect
equilibrium, as it is dominated by the (unique) free trade equilibrium. The choice
of IP-for-IP by any firm in t=0 therefore also acts as a signal which coordinates
the two firms to play the low investment equilibrium in the ensuing R&D game
(see e.g. van Damme, 1989).
5 Cross-licensing: Feature Complementarity
The empirical motivation of the paper mainly stems from the literature on cross-
licensing deals. However, in our base model, transactions take the form of outright
sale of IP from one firm to another. In this section, we consider joint usage of a
patent by both firms such that “trade” of IP now implies (cross-)licensing instead
of a transfer of IP. This not only captures an important aspects of the market for
technology but also shows that IP-for-IP is preferable to even more pronounced
trade restrictions. We thus illustrate the optimality of intermediate levels of trade
restrictions such as IP-for-IP.
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5.1 Model Extension
To capture (cross-)licensing, that is the use of a patent by the inventing firm
and at least one other firm, we assume that patent 2 contains a feature that
complements patent 1, and vice versa. By using both patents, a firm may thus
capture an enhanced maximum value of γV , where γ ≥ 1, from each patent. The
payoffs from using a single patent, however, remain the same. This is illustrated
in table 2 which shows the post-trade payoffs under free trade, IP-for-IP and no
trade for this (and the subsequent) extension. Payoffs only differ from the base
model in case both patents exist.11 Under free trade, firms now realize the full
value of a patent plus the complementary value (γ − 1)V in the two markets.
Under IP-for-IP and asymmetric pre-trade patent allocation, the firm owning the
patents realizes the fully enhanced value only in one market and the reduced
value of δγV in the other market.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Since restricting trade to reciprocal exchange can be profitable for firms,
should firms also consider restricting trade in technology even further? To an-
swer this question, we also consider the most extreme restriction, that is the
commitment by firms not to trade at all. Relative to the IP-for-IP case, this
commitment alters firm payoffs if each firm obtains one patent: Rather than
trading the patents in order to realize gains from barter or patent complementar-
ities, the firms commit to use only the single patent they obtained themselves.
For all other allocations, the payoffs under no trade remain as in the IP-for-IP
case (see table 1).12 Lastly, let costs be as specified in C3.
5.2 Equilibrium Analysis
In a first step, we consider the equilibrium R&D investments under the no trade
scenario, absent any patent complementarities, i.e. let γ = 1. We then get the
11Where payoffs differ from the base model, table cells are highlighted by shading.
12While it may seem that the no trade commitment yields no benefits, it can be shown
that absent patent complementarities (i.e. for γ = 1), an expert equilibrium under no trade
always exists given assumptions C1 and C2. Moreover, this expert equilibrium has higher
expertise than the expert equilibrium under IP-for-IP. Details of the proof are available from
the corresponding author.
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following result:
Lemma 4
In case of no trade in IP and γ = 1, the no trade equilibrium is unique with invest-
ment levels continuous in δ. For δ ∈ [0, δˆ], the equilibrium yields the cooperative
solution; for δ > δˆ, the equilibrium exhibits overinvestment.
Proof: See A.4
This result illustrates that the no trade restriction also allows the firms to
achieve the cooperative solution by focusing each firm’s investments on its area
of expertise. Hence, absent patent complementarities, both IP-for-IP and no trade
yield the same equilibrium in R&D for δ ≤ δˆ and, because there is no value in
cross-licensing, the same payoffs.13 We now consider how these complementarities
(i.e. γ > 1) affect the trade-off between trading scenarios.
The key effect of feature complementarity is to increase the value of both
patents existing. This raises R&D incentives for the firms in both R&D projects.
Consequently, it is also harder for a firm to keep its competitor out of a project.
The strength of this effect is now different under IP-for-IP and no trade. As
will be shown, this implies that the critical value of δ where firms focus only
on one market in equilibrium under IP-for-IP (now labeled δˆIP ) and no trade
(δˆNT ) diverge. Finally, in case of free trade and IP-for-IP, the success of the
R&D process has a potential positive externality for the other firm, as it raises
the other patent’s value if cross-licensing is agreed upon. This implies that the
jointly optimal (cooperative) investment levels will differ from the equilibrium
levels when only one firm is active in a project.
Proposition 3
For δ ∈ [0, δˆΘ] with Θ ∈ {IP,NT}, the expert equilibrium under trade restriction
Θ is characterized by investment levels s∗,Θii > 0 and s
∗,Θ
ij = 0, where i 6= j.
Evaluated at γ = 1, a marginal increase in γ has the following effects:
1. The critical level of δ where a firm invests only in one project in equilibrium
under IP-for-IP or no trade decreases. The decrease is higher under no trade
than under IP-for-IP, 0 > dδˆ
IP
dγ
> dδˆ
NT
dγ
.
13It can be shown that absent complementarities, there exist values of δ > δˆ such that no
trade yields higher payoffs than IP-for-IP. However, as the subsequent analysis shows, this does
not hold under patent complementarities anymore. We thus do not pursue the no trade analysis
any further.
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2. The jointly optimal investment level increases more than the IP-for-IP ex-
pert equilibrium investment level,
ds
Coop
ii
dγ
>
ds
∗,IP
ii
dγ
.
3. The IP-for-IP expert equilibrium investment level increases whereas the no
trade expert equilibrium level remains unaffected,
ds
∗,IP
ii
dγ
>
ds
∗,NT
ii
dγ
= 0.
Proof: See A.5
The first result in Proposition 3 implies that it is easier to drive a competi-
tor out of a market under IP-for-IP than under no trade. Under no trade, the
only possibility to realize patent complementarities is to be successful in both
projects, whereas under IP-for-IP, patent complementarities can be realized via
cross-licensing. Additionally, parts 2 and 3 of the proposition imply that patent
complementarities lead to an underinvestment problem under IP-for-IP and no
trade. As the underinvestment is more severe under no trade, expected profits are
higher under IP-for-IP than under no trade. Lastly, for γ close to one, IP-for-IP
yields profits close to the jointly optimal level. As a consequence, patent com-
plementarities and cross-licensing under IP-for-IP enable firms to realize higher
profits more often than in case of no trade or free trade.
Further numerical analyses illustrate the case for IP-for-IP relative to the
other trading scenarios. Table 3 provides some results of these computations.
The table shows the (joint) probability of obtaining a patent in a market and the
expected profits for a single firm for the three trading scenarios as well as for the
case of joint decision-making. The results are presented at the two critical values
δˆIP and δˆNT where one firm exits the other firm’s market under IP-for-IP and
no trade, respectively. For γ = 1, these critical values coincide and the results of
the base model are replicated: both IP-for-IP and no trade yield the cooperative
outcome whereas the free trade equilibrium exhibits overinvestment and lower
profits.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The numerical example illustrates how an increase in the complementary value
of a patent affects equilibrium patent probabilities. With the exception of invest-
ments under no trade at (and below) δˆNT , all probabilities increase. However,
IP-for-IP equilibrium investments now result in underinvestment relative to the
cooperative solution. Nevertheless, for γ > 1, IP-for-IP now yields the highest
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expected profits. While no trade is still preferable to free trade for low com-
plementarity values, it yields lowest profits for higher values of γ. The strictly
higher profits under IP-for-IP thus show that there is a strong case for choos-
ing IP-for-IP as an intermediate trade restriction under cross-licensing based on
patent complementarities.
6 Asymmetric Firms
So far, the model has assumed that both firms are symmetric in all respects.
Given one of our motivations in the introduction – Intel’s IP-for-IP strategy – we
are now interested in an asymmetric setting where one of the two firms enjoys an
exogenous competitive advantage over the other firm. An important difference
between large and small is the availability of specialized complementary assets
(Teece, 1986). Larger firms have more assets in place and are thus able to prof-
itably exploit a wider range of innovations that smaller firms. We capture this
idea in our model by driving a wedge between both firms’ commercialization abil-
ities (δ). More precisely, we now assume that δ1 = δ ≥ 0 = δ2. That is, firm 2 is
unable to commercialize patent 1 whereas firm 1 may still obtain a positive value
from patent 2. Given this modification, firm 2’s motives to invest in project 1 are
reduced to obtaining patent 1 as a trading good (either in exchange for cash or
IP). Under an IP-for-IP strategy, if firm 1 does not hold patent 2 then the value
of patent 1 is zero for firm 2 as the latter is unable to commercialize patent 1 and
trade is ruled out.14 In contrast, firm 1 still obtains a positive value from patent 2
when trade is not possible.15 The asymmetry introduced implies that asymmetric
equilibria have to be taken into account. As the general analysis easily becomes
intractable, we use numerical analyses to derive the following results (with costs
as specified in C3).
Firm 1’s higher commercialization ability gives it an advantage over firm 2 in
both trading scenarios. Consequently, firm 1 invests more in market 2 than firm 2
invests in market 1. Under IP-for-IP, firm 1 is now able to drive its competitor
out of market 1 while it remains active itself in market 2. It can be shown that
14As before, in this part of the analysis we assume that an IP-for-IP strategy rules out any
cash payments.
15See table 2 for the full payoff structure.
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such an equilibrium exists for δ ≤ δˆasym with δˆasym > δˆ. As in the base model,
firm 1 also also exits market 2 in the IP-for-IP expert equilibrium if δ ≤ δˆ. Hence,
the IP-for-IP expert equilibrium is symmetric for δ ∈ [0, δˆ]. For all other cases,
equilibria are asymmetric.
While the structure of equilibria is fairly intuitive, the optimal choice of trad-
ing restrictions is more complex in case of asymmetric firms. Table 4 illustrates
this for two specific numerical examples evaluated at the two critical values of
δ. The results show that for a lower market value of patents (V = 20), firm 2
prefers IP-for-IP over free trade for a larger parameter range of δ than firm 1.
It even prefers IP-for-IP for values strictly above δˆ: as equilibrium investments
and profits are continuous in δ, the difference in firm 2 profits between IP-for-IP
and free trade only becomes negative at a value of δ strictly between δˆ and δˆasym.
Firm 1 on the other hand strictly prefers free trade over IP-for-IP at δ = δˆ. How-
ever, for higher market value of patents (V = 100), firm 1 prefers IP-for-IP for
all δ ∈ [0, δˆasym].
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Although our numerical results show that firms’ preferred trading scenario
changes with the market value of patents, they also suggest that asymmetries
lead to a more frequent choice of IP-for-IP: As the trading restriction can be
enforced unilaterally, it suffices that one firm prefers IP-for-IP over free trade.
Irrespective of the numerical parameters, this is always true for parameters of
firm 1’s commercialization ability in a range strictly larger than the range in the
base model, [0, δˆ].
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper argues that the type of currency used in technology transactions may
have an impact on R&D competition among firms. In the simplest set-up, the
model has two firms allocate their research budget over two R&D projects. Firms’
R&D technologies are homogeneous across both projects. However, firms have
heterogeneous commercialization abilities regarding the output of the two projects
which enables them to realize potential gains from trade upon the completion of
R&D activity. We analyze the effects that arise from a trade restricting strategy
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which restrains firms from using cash when trading technology. The model shows
that the introduction of such an IP-for-IP strategy causes a trade-off. On the one
hand, firms forego potential gains from trade as in some cases desirable trade does
not take place because it would require cash transactions. On the other hand,
these trade restrictions drive a wedge between the two projects and thus soften
R&D competition. That is, under an IP-for-IP strategy, both firms concentrate
their R&D effort on the project where they have a higher commercialization abil-
ity. The model suggests that IP-for-IP can be a profitable strategy as long as
the difference between firms’ commercialization abilities as well as patent com-
plementarities are sufficiently high. In sum, we show that the way IP is traded
has an impact on the creation of technology. The paper thus gives an ex-ante
orientated explanation why cash might be a different currency than IP in the
market for technology.
By focusing our analysis on the investment stage of the R&D process, we
willingly ignored several important aspects. Probably most important is the
issue of welfare implications. Our model only encompasses firms’ surplus, thus
disregarding consumer welfare or the social value of patents. Hence, the reduction
in excessive R&D investments under IP-for-IP might be less desirable from a
welfare point of view. Furthermore, more specific modeling of the post-patent
competition stage can be informative for issues of competition policy. Lastly,
patent infringements and litigation affect the post-R&D allocation of patents and
thus affect the trading outcomes. This in turn might affect the optimal choice
of trade restrictions. All the above-mentioned aspects lend themselves to future
analysis.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Part 1.: Inspection of the payoffs in table 1 shows that for δ = 1, the two
scenarios yield identical payoffs for each pre-trade allocation.
Part 2.: The proof proceeds as follows: We first redefine strategies such that the
game can be shown to be a symmetric supermodular game. This proofs existence
of symmetric extremal equilibria, e.g. see Vives (1999), Chapter 2, Theorem 2.3
and Remark 15, or Vives (2005), Section 4, Results 1 and 2. Second, we show that
for any equilibrium s˜ii, s˜ij with s˜ii < s˜ij, there exists another equilibrium with
sii > sij. Hence, the maximum equilibrium is an expert equilibrium as defined in
section 2.
Let firm i’s strategy in market j 6= i be fij = 1− sij. Then the game starting
in t=1 is supermodular in either trading scenario:
• The strategy spaces of the two firms, [0, 1]2, is compact.
• Firm i’s profit is supermodular in its own strategies:
∂2piFTi
∂sii∂fij
=
∂2ci
∂sii∂sij
≥ 0 (5)
and
∂2piIPi
∂sii∂fij
=
V
4
(1− δ)(1− fji)(2− sjj) + ∂
2ci
∂sii∂sij
≥ 0 (6)
• Firm i’s profit is characterized by increasing differences in its competitor’s
strategies: for j 6= i,
∂2piFTi
∂sii∂sjj
= 0 (7)
∂2piFTi
∂sii∂fji
=
V
4
(3− δ) ≥ 0 (8)
∂2piFTi
∂fij∂sjj
=
V
4
(1 + δ) ≥ 0 (9)
∂2piFTi
∂fij∂fji
= 0 (10)
20
and
∂2piIPi
∂sii∂sjj
=
V
4
(1− δ)(1− fij)(1− fji) ≥ 0 (11)
∂2piIPi
∂sii∂fji
=
V
4
(2 + (1− δ)(1− fij)(2− sjj)) ≥ 0 (12)
∂2piIPi
∂fij∂sjj
=
V
4
(2δ + (1− δ)(2− sii)(1− fji)) ≥ 0 (13)
∂2piIPi
∂fij∂fji
=
V
4
(1− δ)(2− sii)(2− sjj) ≥ 0 (14)
Extremal equilibria exist and are symmetric in a symmetric supermodular game.
Hence, there exists a maximum equilibrium in either trading scenario, i.e. an
equilibrium (s∗ii, f
∗
ij = 1− s∗ij) with
s∗ii ≥ s′ii and f ∗ij ≥ f ′ij ⇔ s∗ij ≤ s′ij (15)
for any other equilibrium (s′ii, f
′
ij = 1− s′ij) where i 6= j.
Next, assume there exists an equilibrium with sij > sii in trading scenario
Θ ∈ {FT, IP}. Then, the (symmetric) minimum equilibrium (s˜ii, f˜ij = 1 − s˜ij)
in this scenarion also has s˜ii < s˜ij and has to satisfy
∂piΘi
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
sii=s˜ii,fij=f˜ij
≤ 0 and (16)
∂piΘi
∂fij
∣∣∣∣
sii=s˜ii,fij=f˜ij
≤ 0 (17)
We will now show that these conditions imply that there exists a symmetric
equilibrium (sˆii, fˆij = 1− sˆij) with sˆii ≥ 1− f˜ij, fˆij ≥ 1− s˜ii, and hence sˆii > sˆij.
For this equilibrium to exist, it suffices to show that
∂piΘi
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
sii=1−f˜ij ,fij=1−s˜ii
≥ 0 and (18)
∂piΘi
∂fij
∣∣∣∣
sii=1−f˜ij ,fij=1−s˜ii
≥ 0 (19)
If these two conditions are satisfied, the best response function BR(sii, fij) has
BR(sii = 1 − f˜ij , fij = 1 − s˜ii) ≥ (1 − f˜ij, 1 − s˜ii). As supermodularity implies
increasing best response functions and there always exists a symmetric maximum
equilibrium, there has to be an equilibrium at (sˆii, fˆij = 1− sˆij) as defined above.
21
• For free trade, (16) and (17) imply, respecively,
∂ci
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
sii=s˜ii,fij=f˜ij
≥ V
4
(4− (3− δ)(1− f˜ij)) (20)
and
∂ci
∂sij
∣∣∣∣
sii=s˜ii,fij=f˜ij
≤ V
4
(1 + δ)(2− s˜ii) (21)
Using these in the evaluation of (18) and (19) yields, combined with as-
sumption C2,
∂piFTi
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
sii=1−f˜ij ,fij=1−s˜ii
≥ V
2
(1− δ)(1− s˜ii) ≥ 0 (22)
and
∂piFTi
∂fij
∣∣∣∣
sii=1−f˜ij ,fij=1−s˜ii
≥ V
2
(1− δ)f˜ij ≥ 0 (23)
which confirms existence of an equilibrium (sˆii, fˆij = 1 − sˆij) under free
trade.
• For IP-for-IP, (16) and (17) imply, respecively,
∂ci
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
sii=s˜ii,fij=f˜ij
≥ V
4
(4− (1− f˜ij)(2 + (1− δ)(1− f˜ij)(2− s˜ii))) (24)
and
∂ci
∂sij
∣∣∣∣
sii=s˜ii,fij=f˜ij
≤ V
4
(2− s˜ii)(2δ + (1− δ)(2− s˜ii)(1− f˜ij)) (25)
Using these in the evaluation of (18) and (19) yields, combined with as-
sumption C2,
∂piIPi
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
sii=1−f˜ij ,fij=1−s˜ii
≥ V
4
(1− δ)(f˜ij(4− 2s˜ii) + 2s˜ii(1− f˜ij − s˜ii))
≥ 0 (26)
(because s˜ij − s˜ii > 0 implies 1− f˜ij − s˜ii > 0) and
∂piIPi
∂fij
∣∣∣∣
sii=1−f˜ij ,fij=1−s˜ii
≥ V
2
(1− δ)f˜ij(2(1− s˜ii) + (1− f˜ij)) ≥ 0 (27)
This confirms existence of an equilibrium (sˆii, fˆij = 1− sˆij) under IP-for-IP.
These arguments show that the maximum equilibrium always has sii ≥ sij and
is therefore always an expert equilibrium.
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Part 3.: Any symmetric equilibrium (s˜ii, s˜ij) with s˜ii < s˜ij yields a lower ex-
pected profit than a symmetric investment allocation (s′ii = s˜ij, s
′
ij = s˜ii): under
free trade and IP-for-IP, the difference in profits is
piFTi (s
′
ii, s
′
ij)− piFTi (s˜ii, s˜ij) = c(s˜ij, s˜ii)− c(s˜ii, s˜ij) > 0 (28)
and
piIPi (s
′
ii, s
′
ij)− piIPi (s˜ii, s˜ij) = V (1− δ)(1− s˜ij)(1− s˜ii)(s˜ij − s˜ii) (29)
+c(s˜ij, s˜ii)− c(s˜ii, s˜ij) > 0
respectively, with c(s˜ij, s˜ii)− c(s˜ii, s˜ij) > 0 by assumption C2. Pareto-dominance
follows from continuous first order conditions which are increasing in expertise
when evaluated at (s′ii, s
′
ij). The latter follows directly for the minimum equilib-
rium from the proof of part 2.; for any other equilibrium with s˜ii < s˜ij, conditions
(16) and (17) hold with equality. Consequently, (18) and (19) hold for all equi-
libria with s˜ii < s˜ij.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
First, redefine profits such that parameter θ ∈ {1, 2} specifies the trading scenario:
pii(sii, fij , θ) = 1{1}(θ)pi
FT
i + 1{2}(θ)pi
IP
i (30)
where 1A(x) is an indicator function taking on the value 1 if x ∈ A and 0 else.
These profits can be shown to have increasing differences in θ for expert equilib-
rium investment levels:
∂pii
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
θ=2
− ∂pii
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
θ=1
=
V
4
(1− δ)sji(1− sij − (1− sjj)sij) > 0 (31)
and
∂pii
∂fij
∣∣∣∣
θ=2
− ∂pii
∂fij
∣∣∣∣
θ=1
=
V
4
(1− δ)(2− sjj)(1− sji − (1− sii)sji) > 0 (32)
where both inequalites hold if sii = sjj ≥ sij = sji which is true for the ex-
pert equilibrium of each trading scenario. For supermodular games, increasing
differences in an exogenous parameter imply that extremal equilibria increase in
that parameter, see e.g. Vives (2005), Section 4, Result 5. Therefore, the expert
equilibrium has expertise increasing in θ, i.e. when switching from free trade to
IP-for-IP.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Part 1.: First order conditions with respect to sii and sij (i 6= j) are
∂piFTi
∂sii
=
V
4
(1− sii)(4− (3− δ)sji)− 1 = 0 (33)
∂piFTi
∂sij
=
V
4
(1− sij)(2− sjj)(1 + δ)− 1 = 0 (34)
The unique symmetric solution (on the interval [0, 1]) is
sFTii = 1−
√
V 2(1 + δ)4 + 32V (1 + δ)2 + 64(1− δ)2 − V (1 + δ)2 − 8(1− δ)
2V (1 + δ)2
(35)
and
sFTij = 1−
√
V 2(1 + δ)4 + 32V (1 + δ)2 + 64(1− δ)2 − V (1 + δ)2 + 8(1− δ)
2V (1 + δ)(3− δ) (36)
For V ≥ 3 both solutions yield values within [0, 1].
Consider next the joint probability of obtaining a patent in project i, 1− (1−
sFTii )(1− sFTji ) = sFTii + sFTji − sFTii sFTji . Total differentiation yields
d[sFTii + s
FT
ji − sFTii sFTji ]
dδ
= (1− sFTji )
dsFTii
dδ
+ (1− sFTii )
dsFTji
dδ
(37)
Because
dsFTii
dδ
=
δ(1− sii)(1− sji)(2− sii) + (1 + δ)(2− sii)
(4− (3− δ)sji)(2− sii)(1 + δ) + δ(1 + δ)(1− sii)(1− sji) > 0(38)
and
dsFTji
dδ
=
(1− sji)(4− (3− δ)sji + 4(1− sii)(1− sji))
(4− (3− δ)sji)(2− sii)(1 + δ) + δ(1 + δ)(1− sii)(1− sji) > 0(39)
R&D investments are increasing in δ,
d(sFTii +s
FT
ji −s
FT
ii s
FT
ji )
dδ
> 0. Finally, compare
the absolute level of the joint probability of obtaining a patent in the free trade
case for δ = 0 with the cooperative level: 1 − (1 − sFTii |δ=0)(1 − sFTji |δ=0) >
1− (1− sCoopii )(1− sCoopji ) if
(
√
V 2 + 32V + 64− V )2 − 64
12V 2
<
1
V
(40)
which is true if V > 3. As this implies overinvestment at the lower boundary of
the joint patent probability, there is overinvestment in the overall free trade case.
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Part 2.: First order conditions for the IP-for-IP case are
∂piIPi
∂sii
=
V
4
(1− sii)(4− sji(2 + (1− δ)sij(2− sjj)))− 1 = 0 (41)
∂piIPi
∂sij
=
V
4
(1− sij)(2− sjj)(2δ + (1− δ)sji(2− sii))− 1 = 0 (42)
We proceed as follows: Here, we show that for δ ≤ δˆ, there exists an equilibrium
which yields the cooperative solution. As the proof that there exists an equilib-
rium over the full range of δ which results in overinvestment is rather extensive, it
is omitted here and made available upon request from the corresponding author.
An equilibrium with firm i active in market i only exists if
∂piIPi
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
sij=sji=0,sjj=sii
= 0 (43)
and
∂piIPi
∂sij
∣∣∣∣
sij=sji=0,sjj=sii=smii
≤ 0 (44)
are satisfied, where smii denotes the solution to (43). Using (41), (43) yields
smii =
V−1
V
, and hence (44) is fullfilled if
δ ≤ 2
V + 1
≡ δˆ (45)
For δ ∈ [0, δˆ], the cooperative solution is thus also an equilibrium.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
First order conditions with respect to sii and sij (i 6= j) are
∂piFTi
∂sii
=
V
2
(1− sii)(2− sji)− 1 = 0 (46)
∂piFTi
∂sij
=
V
2
δ(1− sij)(2− sjj)− 1 = 0 (47)
The unique symmetric equilibrium (on the interval [0, 1]) is
sNTii = 1−
√
16δ + (δ(V + 2)− 4)2 − δV − 2(1 + δ)
2δV
(48)
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and
sNTij = 1−
√
16δ + (δ(V + 2)− 4)2 + δV − 2(1 + δ)
2δV
(49)
for δ > δˆ. At δ = δˆ, (48) and (49) yield sNTii =
V−1
V
and sNTij = 0, i.e. the
cooperative solution, which is also the equilibrium for δ < δˆ.
Finally, for δ ≥ δˆ,
d(sNTii + s
NT
ji − sNTii sNTji )
dδ
=
(1− sNTii )(2− sNTii )(1− sNTji )
δ(3− sNTii − sNTji )
> 0 (50)
which implies overinvestment inequilibrium if δ > δˆ.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We first derive the “monopoly” investment levels s∗,Θii and critical values δˆ
Θ where
firm i exits market j 6= i: Solving
∂piΘi
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
sij=sji=0,sjj=sii
= 0 (51)
for sii yields s
∗,Θ
ii . This can only be an equilibrium if
∂piΘi
∂sij
∣∣∣∣
sii=sjj=s
∗,Θ
ii ,sij=sji=0
≤ 0 (52)
which yields the condition δ ≤ δˆΘ. For Θ ∈ {IP,NT}, these steps result in
s
∗,IP
ii =
V γ +
√
V
√
4− 4γ + V γ2 − 2V
2(V γ − V ) (53)
δˆIP =
2(V γ −√V
√
4− 4γ + V γ2)
(γ − 1)(2 + V γ +√V
√
4− 4γ + V γ2) (54)
and
s
∗,NT
ii =
V − 1
V
(55)
δˆNT =
γ − 1 + 2V − V 2(γ − 1)
1− γ + V + V 2γ (56)
Similarly, the jointly optimal investment level, with sCoopij = s
Coop
ji = 0, can be
derived by solving
∂(pii + pij)
∂sii
∣∣∣∣
sij=sji=0,sjj=sii
= 0 (57)
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for sii. This yields
s
Coop
ii =
3V − 2V γ −√V
√
8 + V − 8γ − 4V γ + 4V γ2
2(2V γ − 2V ) (58)
By L’Hoˆpital’s rule, one can show that for γ = 1, sCoopii = s
∗,IP
ii = s
∗,NT
ii =
V−1
V
and δˆIP = δˆNT = δˆ.
Part 1.: Differentiating δˆIP and δˆNT with respect to γ at γ = 1 yields
dδˆIP
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1
= −22V
2 − 1− V
V (V + 1)2
< 0 (59)
and
dδˆNT
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1
= −V
2 + 2V − 3
V + V 2
< 0 (60)
Similarly,
d(δˆIP − δˆNT )
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1
=
V 3 − V 2 + V − 1
V (V + 1)2
> 0 (61)
Parts 2. and 3.: Differentiating sCoopii , s
∗,IP
ii and s
∗,NT
ii with respect to γ at
γ = 1 yields
ds
Coop
ii
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1
= 2
V − 1
V 2
> 0 (62)
ds
∗,IP
ii
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1
=
V − 1
V 2
> 0 (63)
ds
∗,NT
ii
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1
= 0 (64)
and
d(sCoopii − s∗,IPii )
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1
=
V − 1
V 2
> 0 (65)
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(ω1, ω2) p(ω1, ω2) pii(ω1, ω2)
Free trade IP-for-IP
(∅, ∅) (1− s11)(1− s21)(1− s12)(1− s22) pi1 = 0
pi2 = 0
pi1 = 0
pi2 = 0
(1, ∅) (s11(1− s21) + 12s11s21)(1− s12)(1− s22) pi1 = V
pi2 = 0
pi1 = V
pi2 = 0
(2, ∅) (s21(1− s11) + 12s21s11)(1− s12)(1− s22) pi1 = 1−δ2 V
pi2 =
1+δ
2
V
pi1 = 0
pi2 = δV
(∅, 2) (1− s11)(1− s21)(s22(1− s12) + 12s12s22) pi1 = 0
pi2 = V
pi1 = 0
pi2 = V
(∅, 1) (1− s11)(1− s21)(s12(1− s22) + 12s12s22) pi1 = 1+δ2 V
pi2 =
1−δ
2
V
pi1 = δV
pi2 = 0
(1, 1) (s11(1 − s21) + 12s11s21)(s12(1 − s22) +
1
2
s12s22)
pi1 =
3+δ
2
V
pi2 =
1−δ
2
V
pi1 = (1 + δ)V
pi2 = 0
(2, 2) (s21(1 − s11) + 12s21s11)(s22(1 − s12) +
1
2
s12s22)
pi1 =
1−δ
2
V
pi2 =
3+δ
2
V
pi1 = 0
pi2 = (1 + δ)V
(2, 1) (s12(1 − s22) + 12s12s22)(s21(1 − s11) +
1
2
s21s11)
pi1 = V
pi2 = V
pi1 = V
pi2 = V
(1, 2) (s11(1 − s21) + 12s11s21)(s22(1 − s12) +
1
2
s12s22)
pi1 = V
pi2 = V
pi1 = V
pi2 = V
Table 1: Patent allocations and payoffs
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Feature Complementarity Asymmetric Firms
(ω1, ω2) pii(ω1, ω2) pii(ω1, ω2)
Free trade IP-for-IP No trade Free trade IP-for-IP
(∅, ∅) pi1 = 0
pi2 = 0
pi1 = 0
pi2 = 0
pi1 = 0
pi2 = 0
pi1 = 0
pi2 = 0
pi1 = 0
pi2 = 0
(1, ∅) pi1 = V
pi2 = 0
pi1 = V
pi2 = 0
pi1 = V
pi2 = 0
pi1 = V
pi2 = 0
pi1 = V
pi2 = 0
(2, ∅) pi1 = 1−δ2 V
pi2 =
1+δ
2
V
pi1 = 0
pi2 = δV
pi1 = 0
pi2 = δV
pi1 =
1
2
V
pi2 =
1
2
V
pi1 = 0
pi2 = 0
(∅, 2) pi1 = 0
pi2 = V
pi1 = 0
pi2 = V
pi1 = 0
pi2 = V
pi1 = 0
pi2 = V
pi1 = 0
pi2 = V
(∅, 1) pi1 = 1+δ2 V
pi2 =
1−δ
2
V
pi1 = δV
pi2 = 0
pi1 = δV
pi2 = 0
pi1 =
1+δ
2
V
pi2 =
1−δ
2
V
pi1 = δV
pi2 = 0
(1, 1) pi1 =
3+δ
2
γV
pi2 =
1−δ
2
γV
pi1 = (1+ δ)γV
pi2 = 0
pi1 = (1+ δ)γV
pi2 = 0
pi1 =
3+δ
2
V
pi2 =
1−δ
2
V
pi1 = (1− δ)V
pi2 = 0
(2, 2) pi1 =
1−δ
2
γV
pi2 =
3+δ
2
γV
pi1 = 0
pi2 = (1+ δ)γV
pi1 = 0
pi2 = (1+ δ)γV
pi1 =
1
2
V
pi2 =
3
2
V
pi1 = 0
pi2 = V
(2, 1) pi1 = γV
pi2 = γV
pi1 = γV
pi2 = γV
pi1 = δV
pi2 = δV
pi1 = (1 +
δ
2
)V
pi2 = (1− δ2)V
pi1 = V
pi2 = V
(1, 2) pi1 = γV
pi2 = γV
pi1 = γV
pi2 = γV
pi1 = V
pi2 = V
pi1 = V
pi2 = V
pi1 = V
pi2 = V
Table 2: Extensions: Patent allocations and payoffs (shaded cells indicate changes from the base model)
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γ = 1.00 γ = 1.01 γ = 1.10
Jointly optimal patent probability 0.938 0.939 0.947
Patent probability at δ = δˆNT
Free trade 0.971 0.971 0.973
IP-for-IP 0.938 0.938 0.943
No trade 0.938 0.938 0.938
Patent probability at δ = δˆIP
Free trade 0.971 0.971 0.975
IP-for-IP 0.938 0.938 0.943
No trade 0.938 0.940 0.952
Jointly optimal firm profits 12.227 12.368 13.649
Firm profits at δ = δˆNT
Free trade 11.995 12.142 13.469
IP-for-IP 12.227 12.368 13.646
No trade 12.227 12.227 12.227
Firm profits at δ = δˆIP
Free trade 11.995 12.137 13.426
IP-for-IP 12.227 12.368 13.646
No trade 12.227 11.740 9.655
Table 3: Feature complementarity: Numerical results for V = 16
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V = 20 V = 100
Jointly optimal firm profits 16.004 94.395
Firm 1 profits at δ = δˆ
Free trade 16.204 93.759
IP-for-IP 16.004 94.395
Firm 1 profits at δ = δˆasym
Free trade 16.298 93.779
IP-for-IP 16.025 94.396
Firm 2 profits at δ = δˆ
Free trade 15.274 92.769
IP-for-IP 16.004 94.395
Firm 2 profits at δ = δˆasym
Free trade 15.167 92.749
IP-for-IP 14.293 92.454
Table 4: Asymmetric firms: Numerical results
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